Update from Dane Smith
South Sudan
The UN Commission on Human Rights in Sudan reports to the UN Human Rights Council that, despite a diminution of hostilities at the national level, “unprecedented levels of ethnically based violence threaten to spiral out of control because of lack of justice and accountability.” The Commission said that more than 75% of South Sudan is experiencing “murderous violence” at the local level. It cited some of the most brutal attacks of the past seven years as occurring in the Central Equatoria, Warrap, Jonglei and the Greater Pibor Administrative Area, surpassing the level in 2013 when civil war broke out.
A modest step toward dealing with the problem may have been taken last week when President Salva Kiir named state ministers, commission heads, and advisors for Central Equatoria State, hopefully launching the creation of functioning governments in all 10 states — apparently a highly centralized process. The input of the governor into these appointments is not clear.
In early February, the Government’s Task Force on COVID-19 imposed a new partial lockdown as new COVID-19 cases surged, including four new cases within the Office of the President. However, little information has emerged since about measures to mitigate the pandemic. Only 6600 cases have been reported with 86 deaths, but that is almost certainly a considerable undercount. On February 8, the Ministry of Health announced that the country would receive 800,000 Astra Zeneca vaccine doses by the end of the month, but there has not yet been confirmation of receipt.
In most parts of South Sudan students in the final year of secondary school sat for exams in December. However, exams were canceled in Jonglei and Unity states on the pretext that insecurity made them impossible in these areas under SPLM/IO control. However, a deal was apparently worked out with Riek Machar, and it was announced that exams were to take place in both states last week. Primary school students in the Juba area sat for exams in December.
Amid tensions between Sudan and Ethiopia, the Government of South Sudan signed in Addis Ababa last week a military agreement with Ethiopia. The agreement reportedly focuses on exchanges of information on military security, curbing illicit arms and human trafficking at border areas, and cooperation in areas of education and training.
Sudan
On February 8, Prime Minister Hamdok reshuffled his Cabinet to include representatives of rebel groups which signed the Juba Agreement. Most strikingly, the new Finance Minister is Jibril Ibrahim, head of the Justice & Equality Movement (JEM). The new Foreign Minister is Mariam al-Sadiq al-Mahdi, daughter of the late former Prime Minister Sadiq al-Mahdi. Before joining the rebellion in Darfur, Jibril completed a doctorate in economics in Japan. I became well acquainted with him during negotiations of the Doha Agreement on Darfur in 2011 when he represented JEM and I was Senior Advisor for Darfur to the US Government. Two new ministers come from the military, while the rest represent the Force of Freedom and Change, the movement which ousted President Bashir and brought Hamdok to power.
Unfortunately, there appears to have been no progress in bringing the two rebel movements who refused to sign the Juba Agreement to a settlement. SPLM/al-Hilu charged February 21 that “the government has no will to reach peace.”
One of Jibril Ibrahim’s first actions was to devalue the Sudanese pound, a major demand of donor governments. The Crisis Group reports that protests have broken out in parts of Sudan over rapidly deteriorating living conditions, including rising prices of staple foods. Looting and arson caused several regions, including Darfur, North Kordofan, South Kordofan and Sennar, to declare states of emergency. Of course, the immediate effect of devaluation will be to spike prices for imported food. So further measures will be essential to ease the strain for the population.
Executive Director
SEE YOU THERE!
AFRECS will be attending (virtually, of course) the 2021 CEEP Networks Digital Annual Conference: The Church as Witness for a Time Such as This March 3-5. Look for our Sponsor “Booth” and come on in! Or search keyword; “Our Neighbors”, and you will be invited in.
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AFRECS School for Orphans and Unaccompanied Minors in POC3 Hopes to Grow from 350 to 500 Students
To hear their song about their journey to safety, click here: https://vimeo.com/339242040
Since the School for Orphans and Unaccompanied Minors was founded with AFRECS’s funding four years ago, the School has become a magnet for students in Protection of Civilians Camp 3 (POC3) (now identified officially as an Internally Displaced Person (IDP) camp). The School’s student body has grown from the original 50 to 350, and hopefully soon 500, with each student missing at least one, and often both, parents due to the civil conflict that began in 2013. The Episcopal Church of South Sudan, led by His Grace, Archbishop Justin Badi Arama, and with the assistance of Bishop John Gatteck, has created a school that teaches and feeds children from grades one through eight with 180 girls and 170 boys.
Despite a shutdown due to COVID 19 restrictions, the students were able to complete three terms of instruction, sit the examinations for these terms and receive their report cards. With AFRECS’s support, some classrooms were refurbished during this period.
The expansion to 500 students will require the construction or refurbishment of semi-permanent classrooms, along with a kitchen and storeroom needed to feed the larger number of students. The expansion will also include construction of a fence around the school grounds to protect the teachers and students, and provision of wash facilities, water tanks, sanitizers, and soap.
The School has not only helped to feed and educate students, but it has also been a successful center for learning. Over 90% of students pass their final exams, and students from the School regularly are among the top performers on the nationalized standard exams.
We at AFRECS are deeply appreciative of all our donors and members for helping us to fulfill this critically important ministry. We welcome your support as we continue to show that the Church in South Sudan can make a positive difference in these children’s lives.
Other News from Various Sources
From Just Security
U. S. Can Change the Calculus for Peace in South Sudan
by Brian Adeba (February 13, 2021 – condensed by Richard Jones)
(Photo by TONY KARUMBA/AFP via Getty Images)
For more than two years, South Sudan’s leaders have engaged in stalling tactics that have stymied the implementation of the peace deal signed in September 2018. While President Salva Kiir and opposition leader Riek Machar prolong the implementation of the peace deal, opportunities for good governance are being squandered.
Intractable problems, such as inter-ethnic blood feuds and militarized cattle raiding, cannot be resolved due to the lack of political leadership at the state level. In the first week of February alone, seven people died in inter-ethnic fighting in Lakes and Warrap states. The chief of staff of Machar’s rebel army refuses to set foot in the capital, indicating he is not happy with the security arrangements. A hybrid court stipulated in the peace deal will not be established on time, and critical evidence required for the prosecution of cases may be lost, making it more difficult to hold war criminals accountable. The failure to reconstitute the National Legislature within the first few months of the deal means that critical oversight on government budgets and spending is missing. There are no checks on impunity. Leaders are taking advantage of the chaos to increase their own wealth at the expense of the people.
Intermittent pressure from the international community has failed to spur change thus far. But with the Biden administration now in place, the United States has an unprecedented opportunity to change the calculus of South Sudan’s reticent leaders and prevent a return to violence.
The good news is that the Biden administration does not need to start from scratch. The toolkit for these measures already exists. The Global Magnitsky Act, anti-money laundering measures, asset freezes, and Treasury Department advisories are tools that, if deployed strategically, can dissuade self-serving leaders in South Sudan from further stalling progress in implementing the peace agreement.
The first step is to go after the spoilers who are undermining the peace agreement. These officials engage in human rights abuses such as the illegal arrest and detention of journalists and civil society activists. They introduce obstacles to stymie the implementation of the peace agreement—by rejecting outright all the candidates for office proposed by the opposition, for instance. Worse, they are complicit in violating signed ceasefires and attacking opponents’ positions. Just last year, in November, government and rebel troops accused one another of initiating attacks against the military and civilians alike. To send a clear message that impunity for such actions no longer reigns, the United States should expand its use of the Global Magnitsky Act with targeted measures against more individuals or entities, for example.
Next, the kleptocratic governance structure that fuels the war must be cracked. By deploying financial pressures against networks—targeting individual peace spoilers, their companies, and their international business associates—concurrently with anti-money laundering measures, asset freezes, and advisories, the Biden administration could maximize the possibility of meaningful outcomes.
In the past, targeted measures by the Treasury Department have been successful in effecting change: they were partly responsible for cajoling reluctant politicians to agree to sign the peace deal in 2018. With the buy-in of allies Britain and Norway, which have been guarantors to the peace process since 2014, as well as the European Union and African Union, these pressures can be applied in a concerted manner to change the calculus for war in South Sudan.
Such a strategy could, for instance, be tied to South Sudan achieving short- and long-term goals with clear benchmarks that leaders must deliver on within a specified timeline. Now, an urgent short-term goal could include achieving progress on stalled elements of the peace deal—such as the creation of unified armed forces—and completing the formation of government at the state level. Future stability in South Sudan depends entirely on good governance marked by independent and effective institutions that can hold officials accountable, so a long-term diplomatic strategy could be connected to achieving progress on the institutional reforms spelled out in Chapter IV of the peace agreement.
Along with financial pressure, the United States could reinvigorate its diplomatic track by appointing a highly respected senior diplomat as a special envoy who would have clout and respect in East Africa and the Horn of Africa. That would signal to leaders responsible for the South Sudanese conflict that Washington accords a high priority to realizing a serious peace.
If the United States takes concrete steps to counter the incentive structure, the world’s youngest country may finally have a chance at peace.
https://www.justsecurity.org/
United States Institute of Peace
What Does Sudan’s New Cabinet Mean for its Transition?
The Cabinet has a golden opportunity to build political consensus and address citizens’ concerns.
Monday, February 8, 2021 / By: Joseph Tucker (Abstracted)
The announcement on February 8 of a new Cabinet in Khartoum—the product of a peace accord signed by Sudan’s transitional government with several armed groups in October 2020 through a deal brokered by South Sudan—offers hope that the broader inclusion of political leaders can help address Sudan’s pressing challenges and create peace dividends.
Twenty-five ministers were announced. The ministers of defense and interior hail from the security sector as previously agreed between the government’s civilian and military factions. Other posts have gone to high-profile political leaders—for example, Gibril Ibrahim from Darfur’s Justice and Equality Movement has been appointed finance minister and Mariam Sadiq al-Mahdi from the Umma Party is the new foreign minister.
Building Confidence in Peace and Power-Sharing
For those ministers representing armed movements, it will be important to build trust with citizens that may view them as closer to Sudan’s security elements than the nonviolent street revolutionaries who ended Bashir’s nearly 30-year grip on power. A way to achieve this is for the Cabinet to begin implementing the complex October 2020 peace deal and ensure that the public understands the agreement’s national impact.
Urgent Decisions or Paralysis?
Having reached consensus on political representation, the new Cabinet will need to quickly show that its broad coalition of forces can work closely with Sudanese Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok to address key issues. It is also important for the Cabinet to have the strong backing of Hamdok and key officials in his office to take unpopular decisions when needed. Some key issues are: unifying exchange rates and continuing to reform subsidies; engaging with military leaders to begin security sector reform that prioritizes citizens’ security; reenergizing negotiations for a more comprehensive peace that includes important armed movements from South Kordofan and Darfur; navigating legitimate demands for transitional justice and accountability; and outlining a foreign policy that defuses regional tensions—especially with Ethiopia and also due to the ongoing Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam negotiations—and reappraises Sudan’s relationship with Egypt, the United Arab Emirates, and other Gulf states.
During Bashir’s National Congress Party era, political and armed actors appointed to Cabinets were often viewed as collaborators with neither independence nor authority. Now, the opposite appears true; current ministers represent several sources of power and some can mobilize constituencies in support of, or against, decisions. It will be imperative for such ministers to indicate that they collectively represent the diverse landscape of Sudanese political, geographic, and social groups. More importantly, they must show through action, not just rhetoric, that such diversity can be harnessed to address the root causes of Sudan’s conflicts.
An Historic Time in Sudan
Sudan is going through a once-in-a-generation transition that touches every facet of life, from the role of marginalized communities in political decisions to economic choices that will shape the country for decades. Sudanese are creating space to debate issues central to the idea of Sudan as a nation, such as the relationship between religion and the state. Recent months have seen the reentry of Sudan into the community of nations through growing international support for reforms and early efforts to address the country’s staggering debt burden in the wake of the December 2020 removal of Sudan’s designation as a state sponsor of terrorism by the United States.
However, the country remains beset with economic crises and food shortages and citizens again took to the streets in recent weeks to protest rising costs and commodity shortages. Sudan faces continued conflict in Darfur, growing political unease in the east and the specter of regional war with Ethiopia.
The Potential of Politics
If the new Cabinet can rise to the occasion, it has a golden opportunity to become a model for political consensus-building and equitable decision-making in Sudan. Whereas the previous Cabinet’s ministers were selected for their technocratic capabilities and seemingly apolitical stances, this new Cabinet is arguably one of the most politicized governing bodies in Sudanese history.
A united Cabinet can show that astute political leadership matched with continued reform of government institutions can produce a winning combination for managing diversity and preventing conflict in fragile states like Sudan. The Cabinet’s coherence and its ability to define roles among ministries and publicly articulate an agenda for the transition will be important for the overall functioning of the transitional government. This can also set a foundation for strong engagement with the international community on possible support and mutually accountable partnerships.
A well-functioning Cabinet can demonstrate to Sudanese that politicians are capable of governing and reduce the perennial unleashing of military coups that have plagued Sudan’s prior civilian governments. However, if leaders carry political conflicts and ideological rivalries with them into the Cabinet, this could decisively imperil an already tenuous transition and restart the cycle of conflict that Sudan and the region can ill afford.
https://www.usip.org/
From Sudan Tribune
South Sudan issues new banknotes amid rising inflation
February 9, 2021 (JUBA) – South Sudan’s Central Bank on Tuesday issued a 1,000 South Sudanese Pound banknote as it struggles with hyperinflation amid dwindling foreign reserves.
Speaking to reporters in the capital, Juba, the Central Bank governor, Dier Tong Ngor said the bank will henceforth embark on a nationwide campaign to educate the public on the new notes.
“It is in the view of the need to make our currency more convenient to use that we are today introducing the SSP 1000 banknote into circulation to complement the existing banknotes to ensure convenience and bring about efficiency in the printing of currency to generate savings for the country,” he explained.
Ngor said the world youngest nation has, in the past few years, grappled with how to address a situation characterized by high inflation, including perpetual depreciation of the currency which has eroded public confidence and monetary value of the banknotes.
“This new higher value denomination will only partially restore the dollar value of SSP 10 in 2011 but is high enough to significantly reduce the deadweight loss and high transaction cost in making high-value purchases in a cash-based economy like South Sudan,” he stressed.
Several economists have questioned the impact the new banknote will have on economic recovery, citing further destabilization of consumer prices and acceleration of inflationary behaviors.
South Sudan depends on oil revenue for 98% of its budget, but production has since decreased significantly due to a political conflict which erupted in December 2013, causing most oil companies to cease explorative plans, and shut down operations in the oil field.
https://sudantribune.com/spip.
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We continue to be grateful that contributions from you, our supporters, nurture AFRECS in expanding our impact. You make a difference in the essential peacebuilding work of the Episcopal Church of South Sudan. We hope you will consider another generous gift — or whatever you can afford in this time of COVID — as we begin our new program year You can contribute online at https://afrecs.org or send a check made out to AFRECS to P.O. Box 3327, Alexandria, VA 22302
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This issue of the AFRECS E-Blast was compiled by Board members Richard Jones, Steven Miles, and Caroline Klam.